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Besley and Ghatak (2001) show that public good should be owned by the
agent who values the public good most — irrespective of technological factors.
In this paper we relax their assumptions in a natural way by allowing the
agents to be indispensable and show that relative valuations are not the sole
determinant of optimal ownership structure but also nature of human capital
and technology matter.
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Besley and Ghatak (2001) extend the property rights theory of Grossman
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) to analyze the ownership of
public goods. Their main result is that the agent who has the highest
valuation for the public good should be the owner irrespective of who is the
key investor or other technological factors. We relax their assumptions in
a natural way by allowing the agents to be indispensable and show that
although the valuation of public good is an important determinant of the
optimal ownership structure, technology — and particularly the nature of
human capital — matter too.
Default payoﬀs determine the bargaining position of the parties and their
incentives in the property rights theory. The only determinant of the default
payoﬀ that Besley and Ghatak (2001) (BG) examine is spillovers: how much
of an agent’s human capital is sunk in the project. We look more carefully
into another characteristic of human capital: the indispensability of an agent.
If an agent is indispensable or very important as a trading partner, the
owner’s human capital does not have any value without the worker. BG
assumptions imply that the agents are relatively dispensable. We relax their
assumptions and show that the valuation for the public good is not the sole
determinant of the optimal ownership structure.
Suppose two agents are involved in producing the public good. The
agents diﬀer in how they value the public good: h’s valuation is higher than
l’s. Suppose also that only agent l makes a project-speciﬁc investment.
Since they are producing public good everyone can consume it even if the
agents cannot reach an agreement in bargaining. The main insight of BG is
that when l increases his investment, h’s default payoﬀ is increased by more
than l’s default payoﬀ (because of his higher valuation) resulting in worse
bargaining position for l. To minimize this negative eﬀect it is better to
choose an ownership structure where l’s investment contributes least to the
default payoﬀs. This is the case when h is the owner: then only the part of
l’s investment that is sunk in the project contributes to the default payoﬀs.
The main result of BG is that the high-valuation agent should own the public
good even when the low-valuation agent is the key investor.
However, there is also a role for the nature of human capital. Suppose
that h is indispensable: without h in the team l’s human capital is not pro-
ductive. Suppose also that there are spillovers from l’s human capital. Now
the ownership structure that minimizes the negative eﬀect on l’s incentives
1is l-ownership. If l owns the public good and cannot reach an agreement
with h, l’s investment does not contribute at all to the public good since l’s
investment is unproductive without h in the team. While under h-ownership
l’s investment worsens his bargaining position to the extent that it is sunk
in the project. Ownership by the low-valuation agent is optimal because of
the nature of human capital.
Now suppose that both agents have an investment. Then also a role
for technology in determining the optimal ownership structure can emerge.
When the agents have asymmetric roles so that h is indispensable and l is
dispensable, then each agent has better incentives if he owns the public
good. The high-valuation agent has the best incentives if he owns the public
good as his investment is fully productive without dispensable l and therefore
improves his bargaining position maximally. While the low-valuation agent
has highest investment when he is the owner because his investment is unpro-
ductive without indispensable h and therefore does not worsen his bargaining
position. Then the key investor should own the public good and therefore
technology matters in determining the optimal ownership structure.
This paper shows that optimal ownership of public good is not solely
driven by the relative valuations but the same factors that drive optimal
ownership of private goods are important also in the public goods case. How-
ever, the nature of human capital and technology play a diﬀerent role in the
public goods case. Providing the key investor with the best incentives may
require taking ownership away from him. This is the case when h is the
key investor and l is indispensable. h’s higher investment does not improve
his bargaining position if he is the owner because he is unproductive without
l. While under l-ownership any spillover from his investment improves his
bargaining position and incentives. Furthermore, it is not always the case
the the indispensable agent should be the owner — as in the private goods
case. When is h indispensable l-ownership is optimal if l is the key investor
— as shown in the previous paragraph.
By now we have established how introducing indispensability changes
BG results. Interestingly, the results furthermore depend on which agent is
indispensable. If it is the low-valuation agent that is indispensable (and the
high-valuation agent is dispensable), then l should always have an ownership
stake; either l-ownership or joint ownership is optimal. While when it is the
high-valuation agent that is indispensable, then they key investor should be
the owner. Indispensability can arise not only from nature of human capital
but also from lack of ex post competition. For example, when the government
2is the only purchaser for the service, then government is indispensable. Our
results indicate that the governance structure appropriate for a developing
country (where a pro-poor NGO is likely to be the high-valuation party)
should diﬀer from that of a developed country (where government typically
is the high-valuation party).
Relatively few papers have been exploring directly the model by Besley
and Ghatak (2001). Rasul (2006) applies their model to child custody and
introduces a continuum of ex post custodial schemes and endogenous proba-
bility of marital breakdown. Francesconi and Muthoo (2010) introduce im-
purity of public goods and show, among other things, that technology deter-
mines optimal ownership structure when degree of impurity is large enough.
In our paper even with pure public goods technology matters. Halonen-
Akatwijuka and Paﬁlis (2009) analyze a repeated version of BG and show
that elasticity of investments, in addition to the relative valuations, deter-
mines the optimal ownership structure. In this paper technology matters
even in the static game. Grosjean (2003) applies BG model to a conservation
project and introduces an opportunity cost paid to a third party. Also in
this setup low-valuation ownership can emerge.
The incomplete contracting literature on privatization (e.g. Hart et al.
(1997) and Schmitz (2000)) and on public-private partnerships (e.g. Hart
(2003), Bennett and Iossa (2006) and Martimort and Poyet (2008)) are re-
lated. We diﬀer in allowing also the private providers to be value driven and
modelling explicitly the public good nature of the projects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model. Section 3 compares investment incentives under h-a n dl-ownership
while Section 4 includes joint ownership in the analysis and analyzes the case
of indispensable government. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We build on Besley and Ghatak (2001) and take a closer look at the nature of
human capital embedded in their assumptions. In our basic model there are
two agents, l and h, with project-speciﬁc investments in human capital, yl
and yh. Public good is produced and the beneﬁt from the project is b(yl,y h).
The agents value the project diﬀerently: l’s utility from the public good is
θlb(yl,y h) and h’s utility is θhb(yl,y h). We assume that θl ≤ θh, that is l is
the low-valuation agent and h is the high-valuation agent. Investments are
3measured by their costs: c(yi)=yi.
We assume that ex ante contracts can only be written on the ownership
of the project. We ﬁrstly compare ownership by l and h a n di nS e c t i o n4
analyze joint ownership. The timing is the following:
1. l and h contract on the ownership of the project
2. l and h invest in project-speciﬁc human capital
3. l and h bargain over completion of the project and produce the public
good
Default payoﬀs play an important role in the analysis. If bargaining
breaks down and i is the owner, the beneﬁt from the project is Bi(yl,y h).
Producing together is eﬃcient: Bi (yl,y h) <b(yl,y h). Each agent values this







∂yi . We assume that
the beneﬁt functions are increasing, concave with bij (yl,y h)=Bk
ij (yl,y h)=0
for i,j,k = l,h and i 6= j and satisfy the Inada endpoint conditions.
We furthermore make an assumption about marginal investment returns
that is weaker than Assumption 1 in Besley and Ghatak (2001).
Assumption 1. bi (yl,y h) ≥ Bi
i (yl,y h) and bi(yl,y h) ≥ B
j
i (yl,y h) for i,j =
l,h and i 6= j.
If bargaining breaks down, the owner can exclude the non-owner from
taking part in the production of the public good but cannot exclude him
from consuming the public good. Therefore non-owner’s investment has
less eﬀect on the beneﬁt from the project if bargaining breaks down. This
explains bi (yl,y h) ≥ B
j
i (yl,y h). The gap between bi (yl,y h) and B
j
i (yl,y h)
depends on how much of the non-owner’s investment is sunk in the project.
We call this spillover.1 The gap is small when investment is e.g. about
designing and organizing the project implementation and plans are already
adopted or written down. In this situation spillover is large and when the
worker leaves, a large part of his investment is already sunk in the project.
The gap is largest when all of the investment is embedded in the person e.g.
charismatic leadership. Then there is no spillover and if the agent leaves, he
takes the investment with him and B
j
i (yl,y h)=0 .
1De Meza and Lockwood (2004) explore spillovers in the private goods case.
4Bi
i (yl,y h) depends on how the value of the owner’s human capital in-
vestment is aﬀected by the presence of the other agent. If the other agent
is dispensable, the owner’s marginal value of investment does not depend
on whether the worker is in the same coalition or not. Then Bi
i (yl,y h)=
bi (yl,y h). While if the owner’s human capital is productive only in presence
of the other agent — the worker is indispensable — we have Bi
i (yl,y h)=0 .
Therefore bi (yl,y h) ≥ Bi
i (yl,y h).
BG assume that bi (yl,y h) ≥ Bi
i (yl,y h) >B
j
i (yl,y h). However, spillovers
and indispensability are clearly diﬀerent properties of the human capital.
There is no clear link between spillovers from agent i’s investment and agent
j’s indispensability, which is why we make a weaker assumption than BG.
Suppose for instance that agent h is indispensable. Without h in the team
l’s human capital is not productive: Bl
l (yl,y h)=0 . Suppose also that some
of l’s human capital is sunk in the project: Bh
l (yl,y h) > 0.S u c h a s i t u a -
tion violates BG assumption since Bh
l (yl,y h) >B l
l (yl,y h) and yet can occur
naturally. Agent h’s indispensability does not in any way imply that there
should be no spillovers from l’s investment. We explore how relaxing this
assumption aﬀects the optimal ownership of public good.
2.1 First best
Joint surplus equals
(θl + θh)b(yl,y h) − yl − yh
Therefore the ﬁrst best investments are characterized by










Due to incompleteness of contracts we cannot obtain ﬁrst best. In what
follows we examine which ownership structure gives second best incentives.
3 Ownership and incentives
When l owns the public good (denoted by superscript l) Nash bargaining






























l (yl,y h) − yh
Optimal investments are then given by
1
2





l (yl,y h)=1 (3)
1
2





h (yl,y h)=1 (4)
The ﬁrst term in (3) and (4) shows that each agent shares 50:50 his
marginal contribution to the total value of the public good. The second term
is negative for the low-valuation agent and positive for the high-valuation
agent. It shows how an increase in investment aﬀects the agent’s bargaining
position. Since this is a public good both parties can consume it even if
they cannot reach an agreement. Therefore higher investment increases both
parties’ default payoﬀs. Since h values the public good more, his default
payoﬀ increases more than l’s default payoﬀ. That is why the second term is
negative for l. l’s higher investment improves h’s bargaining position relative
to l. While h’s higher investment increases both the size of the pie and
his share of it and therefore the second term in (4) is positive. Comparing
the incentives to (1) and (2) we can verify that there is a familiar holdup
problem.
It is straightforward to derive the incentives under h-ownership:
1
2





l (yl,y h)=1 (5)
1
2





h (yl,y h)=1 (6)
Comparing how incentives depend on the ownership structure boils down
to comparing the second terms in (3)− (6). Both agents have higher incen-
tives under h-ownership if and only if
6B
l
l (yl,y h) >B
h
l (yl,y h) (7)
B
h
h (yl,y h) >B
l
h (yl,y h) (8)
These are the assumptions made by BG. Then indeed ownership of the
high-valuation agent gives the best incentives to both agents. h-ownership
maximizes the positive second term for h and minimizes the negative second
term for l. But some properties of human capital are embedded in these
assumptions. To make our case clear we ﬁrst discuss an example with one
investment and then come back to the general setup of the model.
3.1 One investment
Suppose only l invests. Then we only need to examine equation (7). Sup-
pose h is indispensable, Bl
l (yl,y h)=0 . Without h in the team l’s human
capital is not productive. Suppose also that some of l’s human capital is
sunk in the project and so Bh
l (yl,y h) > 0. In this case ownership by the low-
valuation party is optimal since Bl
l (yl,y h) <B h
l (yl,y h). Therefore relative
valuations are not the only determinant of optimal ownership structure but
also the nature of human capital plays an important role. Spillovers and in-
dispensability are diﬀerent characteristics of human capital. Assuming that
h’s indispensability implies that there can be no spillovers from l’s human
capital is restrictive.
Ownership by l is optimal — not because l is the only investor (as it would
be in the private goods case) — but because the optimal ownership structure
minimizes the negative second term in l’s incentives. His investment has
minimal eﬀect on default payoﬀs when he himself is the owner. Since h is
indispensable l’s investment is unproductive without h and higher investment
is not going to worsen his bargaining position under l-ownership.
3.2 Two investments
Now we come back to the two investments case. From (7) and (8) we can
see that the optimal ownership structure depends, in addition to relative
valuations, on Bi
i (yl,y h) − B
j
i (yl,y h). We have four possible cases.
7If both Bl
l (yl,y h) >B h
l (yl,y h) and Bh
h (yl,y h) >B l
h (yl,y h),t h e no w n -
ership by the high-valuation agent gives higher incentives for both agents.
T h e s ea r et h eB Ga s s u m p t i o n s .
If both Bl
l (yl,y h) <B h
l (yl,y h) and Bh
h (yl,y h) <B l
h (yl,y h),t h e nb o t h
agents’ incentives are improved by ownership of the low-valuation agent.
It is interesting to allow for the agents to have asymmetric roles so that
Bi
i (yl,y h) >B
j
i (yl,y h) and B
j
j (yl,y h) <B i
j (yl,y h). In this case also the
relative importance of investments plays a role. Agent i has better incentives
under h-ownership while agent j’s incentives are improved by l-ownership.
Which ownership structure gives the best overall incentives depends on the
relative importance of investments.
Proposition 1 summarize our results.
Proposition 1 (i) Ownership by the low-valuation agent gives higher incen-
tives for both agents than ownership by the high-valuation agent if and only
if Bi
i (yl,y h) <B
j
i (yl,y h) for i,j = l,h and i 6= j.
(ii) Ownership by the high-valuation agent gives higher incentives for both
agents than ownership by the low-valuation agent if and only if Bi
i (yl,y h) >
B
j
i (yl,y h) for i,j = l,h and i 6= j.
(iii) If Bi
i (yl,y h) >B
j
i (yl,y h) and B
j
j (yl,y h) <B i
j (yl,y h) for i,j = l,h
and i 6= j, then agent i has better incentives under h-ownership while agent
j’s investment is higher under l-ownership.








plays a key role and it depends on the
nature of human capital. There are two clear cases when
£
Bi




is positive. Firstly, if agent j is dispensable, then Bi
i (yl,y h)=bi (yl,y h) ≥
B
j
i (yl,y h). Secondly, if there are no spillovers from agent i’s investment,
then B
j
i (yl,y h)=0≤ Bi
i (yl,y h). In other words if it is easy to ﬁnd good
replacements for the agents in the spot market, then ownership by the high-
valuation agent is beneﬁcial — just as in BG. Alternatively, if the investments
are fully embedded in the agents, the same is true. Then ownership by the
high-valuation agent maximizes the positive second term for h and minimizes








may also be negative. Firstly, if agent j




i (yl,y h). Secondly, if there are full spillovers from agent i’s investment,
then B
j
i (yl,y h)=bi(yl,y h) ≥ Bi
i (yl,y h). In both cases an agent’s investment
increases the default payoﬀsm o r ew h e nh ei sn o tt h eo w n e r . T h e r e f o r et o
maximize the positive second term for h we have to remove ownership from
him. While to minimize the negative second term for l we have to give
him the ownership. Therefore low-valuation ownership provides stronger
incentives.
Proposition 1 shows that optimal ownership structure depends on three
factors.
(i) The relative valuations for public good. Higher investment improves
the bargaining position of high-valuation agent but worsens it for the low-
valuation agent. Therefore optimal allocation of ownership is about maxi-
mizing this positive eﬀect for h and minimizing the negative eﬀect for l.T h i s
is the mechanism identiﬁed by BG.
(ii) Nature of human capital. It determines under which ownership struc-








). For the high-valuation agent we wish to
maximize the marginal productivity of the default payoﬀ while for the low-
valuation agent we wish to minimize it. Relative marginal productivities
depend on spillovers and indispensability.
(iii) Technology. In some cases there is a trade-oﬀ between providing
good incentives for h or l. Then the importance of investment determines
the optimal ownership structure.
We have shown that indispensability opens a door for low-valuation own-
ership. We examine this eﬀect more in detail in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 If agent i is indispensable, then agent j has (weakly) better
incentives under ownership by the low-valuation agent than under ownership
by the high-valuation agent.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Proposition 2 says that if an agent is indispensable, then the other agent
has best incentives under ownership by the low-valuation agent. When
h is indispensable, giving ownership to l removes l’s negative second term
because he is unproductive without h.T h e r e f o r e l’s incentives are maximized
9under l-ownership. While when l is indispensable, h’s positive second term
is maximized by removing the ownership from h and allowing for potential
spillovers from his investment. In both cases ownership by the low-valuation
agent improves the incentives of the other agent.
It is also interesting to compare this result to the private goods case. In
Hart and Moore (1990) an indispensable agent should be the owner. How
is it with public goods? Proposition 2 shows that although the nature of
human capital matters for ownership of public goods, its role is diﬀerent than
in the private goods case. With private goods ownership (weakly) improves
the owner’s bargaining position and incentives. Therefore if an agent is in-
dispensable, he should be the owner because ownership cannot improve any
other agent’s bargaining position since the asset is unproductive without the
indispensable agent.2 With public goods it remains to be true that owner-
ship has zero eﬀect on any other agent’s bargaining position. But this is
ab e n e ﬁt when we talk about l’s incentives (and h is indispensable). The
change in relative bargaining position is least harmful for l when he is the
owner. While when it is l who is indispensable, then l-ownership is beneﬁcial
for h because potential spillovers (which can occur only when h is not the
owner) improve h’s bargaining position most.
Full spillover is another characteristic of human capital that gives an edge
to ownership by the low-valuation agent. This result is stated in Proposition
3.
Proposition 3 If there is full spillover from agent i’s investment, then he
has (weakly) better incentives under ownership by the low-valuation agent
than under ownership by the high-valuation agent.
Proof. In the Appendix.
2Hart and Moore (1990) actually assume that there are no spillovers. If we include
spillovers, we do not get unambiguous result. But we can say that the more indispensable
an agent is, the more likely it is that he owns the asset. In their notation if we have 2
agents and one asset a, the incentives under ownership by agent 1 are: 1
2v1 (12,{a})+
1
2v1 (1,{a})=c0(I1) and 1
2v2 (12,{a}) − 1
2v2 (1,{a})=c0(I2).v 2 (1,{a}) measures the
spillover of 2’s investment. While the incentives under 2 ownership are 1
2v1 (12,{a}) −
1
2v1 (2,{a})=c0(I1) and 1
2v2 (12,{a})+1
2v2 (2,{a})=c0(I2).




. 2’s incentives under his ownership
are weaker and therefore ownership by indispensable 1 is more likely. We do not get
unambiguous result because ownership by agent 1 worsens agent 2’s incentives due to
spillovers that improve agent 1’s bargaining position.
10Suppose there is full spillover from h’s investment. The positive second
term for h is maximized when we allow for the full spillover by taking own-
ership away from h. Alternatively, if the full spillover is from l’s investment,
then the negative second term for l is minimized when we remove the full
spillover by giving the ownership to l. In both cases the agent whose invest-
ment is fully sunk in the project has better incentives when low-valuation
agent is the owner. Ownership by the low-valuation agent allows spillovers
for h and removes them from l. Full spillover can result e.g. from investment
in physical capital.
Propositions 2 and 3 show that indispensability and full spillovers favour
ownership by the low-valuation agent. Conversely it is true that dispens-
ability and no spillovers would favour ownership by the high-valuation agent.
We have shown that the nature of human capital matters also for the own-
ership of public goods although its role is diﬀerent than in the private goods
case. In the same way the role of technology is diﬀerent. With private goods
ownership by a key investor is optimal because ownership improves bargain-
ing power and focus should be on key investor’s incentives. With public goods
tradeoﬀ between providing good incentives exists only when the agents have
asymmetric roles: the agents diﬀer either in indispensability or in spillovers.
Only in this asymmetric case we should concentrate on providing good incen-
tives for the key investor at the cost to the other agent’s incentives. But that
may be accomplished by taking ownership away from the key investor. For
example suppose h is a key investor and his investment is in physical capital
(full spillover). Then large investment by the key investor is guaranteed by
removing ownership from him since higher investment improves h’s relative
bargaining power most when investment has full eﬀect on the default point
(full spillover under l-ownership).
4 Indispensable government
We have examined indispensability as a property of human capital; an agent
can be so important that without his contribution to the team the other agent
is unproductive. Indispensability can also result from lack of ex post compe-
tition. This is often the case when a government and a supplier collaborate
to provide a public service and the government is the only purchaser (e.g.
defence, prisons and, in many economies, health and primary education ser-
vices). In such cases the government is indispensable. The supplier, on the
11other hand, can be dispensable because there are plenty of alternative sup-
pliers. In this Section we focus on this relevant case where the government
is indispensable while the supplier can be dispensable.3
Section 3 concentrated on comparing ownership by the high-valuation
and the low-valuation agent. We now include joint ownership in the analysis
and can therefore determine the optimal ownership structure. Under joint
ownership the default payoﬀs are zero as the project cannot go ahead without
approval of both agents.
The incentives under joint ownership are
1
2
(θl + θh)bl (yl,y h)=1 (9)
1
2
(θl + θh)bh (yl,y h)=1 (10)
Joint ownership provides the best incentives for the low-valuation agent as
higher investment cannot worsen his bargaining position when default payoﬀs
are zero. The high-valuation agent on the other hand has the worst incentives
because higher investment does not improve his bargaining position.
In this Section we assume that the government is indispensable but we
allow the government to be either the high-valuation or the low-valuation
party. In a developed country the government typically has a high valuation
for the public good and collaborates with a more private-minded supplier.
In a developing country the roles can be diﬀerent when a government and
a pro-poor NGO collaborate in public good provision. Then the NGO is
the high-valuation party. Interestingly, our results depend on whether the
indispensable government has high or low valuation for the public good.
We ﬁrst examine the case where the high-valuation agent is indispensable.
Proposition 4 gives our result for this case. Note that while Propositions 1 -
3c o m p a r e dl-a n dh-ownership, we can now determine the optimal ownership
structure as we also examine joint ownership.
3If both agents are dispensable, then BG assumption is satisﬁed and h-ownership is
optimal. While if both agents are indispensable, then l-ownership is optimal. Proposition
2s h o w st h a t l-ownership weakly dominates h-ownership. Furthermore, l-ownership
weakly dominates joint ownership because potential spillovers under l-ownership improve
h’s incentives and l’s negative second term is removed under both joint ownership and
l-ownership (due to h being indispensable).
12Proposition 4 Suppose the high-valuation agent is indispensable.
(i) Joint ownership is weakly dominated.
(ii) Key investor should own the public good if the low-valuation agent is
dispensable and the spillovers are intermediate.
Proof. (i) When h is indispensable (Bl
l (yl,y h)=0 ) ,lhas the same
incentives under l-ownership (equation (3)) and under joint ownership (equa-
tion (9)). Joint ownership (weakly) reduces h’s incentives ((4) vs. (10)).
Therefore joint ownership is weakly dominated by l-ownership.
(ii) Assume l is dispensable
¡
Bh
h (yl,y h)=bh (yl,y h)
¢




l (yl,y h) >B l
l (yl,y h)=0
¢
and spillovers from h are not full ¡
Bh
h (yl,y h)=bh (yl,y h) >B l
h (yl,y h)
¢
. Then Proposition 1(iii) shows that
h has higher incentives under h-ownership and l has better incentives under
l-ownership. Therefore if one agent is a key investor, i.e. has very important
investment relative to the other agent, then he should be the owner. Q.E.D.
If h is indispensable, l h a s( w e a k l y )b e s ti n c e n t i v e sw h e nh eo w n st h e
public good. Since he is unproductive without indispensable h, his negative
second term is removed under l-ownership. Therefore l’s incentives can-
not be improved by joint ownership while joint ownership leads to (weakly)
lower investment by h. This is why joint ownership is dominated when h is
indispensable.
When the high-valuation agent is indispensable, the optimal ownership
structure is either h-o rl-ownership since joint ownership is dominated. Fur-
thermore, h has the best incentives when he owns the public good when l is
dispensable as he can realize the full marginal value of his investment with-
out l.4 While agent l’s investment is higher under l-ownership since higher
investment does not worsen his bargaining position when h is indispensable.5
Therefore there is a tradeoﬀ and each agent has the best incentives if he owns
the public good. This is why the key investor should own the public good.
4h’s incentives are strictly greater under h-ownership than under l-ownership assuming
spillover’s from h’s investment are intermediate (not full).
5l’s incentives are strictly greater under l-ownership than under h-ownership assuming
spillover’s from l’s investment are intermediate (positive).
13When it is the low-valuation agent who is indispensable, the results are
quite diﬀerent as Proposition 5 shows.
Proposition 5 Suppose the low-valuation agent is indispensable.
(i) Ownership by the high-valuation agent is weakly dominated.
(ii) Joint ownership is optimal if there are no spillovers from high-valuation
agent.
(iii) If the high-valuation agent is dispensable and there are spillovers from
agent h, joint ownership (ownership by the low-valuation agent) is optimal if
the low-valuation (high-valuation) agent is the key investor.
Proof. (i) When l is indispensable (Bh
h (yl,y h)=0 ) ,hhas the same
incentives under h-ownership (equation (6)) and joint ownership (equation
(10)). Joint ownership weakly increases l’s incentives ((5) vs. (9)).T h e r e -
fore h-ownership is weakly dominated by joint ownership.
(ii) When there are no spillovers for h (Bl
h (yl,y h)=0 )and l is indis-
pensable (Bh
h (yl,y h)=0 ) ,h ’s incentives do not depend on the ownership
structure. Joint ownership is then optimal since it maximizes l’s incentives.
(iii) Optimal ownership structure is either joint ownership or l-ownership
since h-ownership is dominated. l has strictly higher investment under joint
ownership when l is dispensable (Bl
l (yl,y h)=bl (yl,y h)); compare equations
(3) and (9). While h has strictly better incentives under l-ownership when
there are spillovers from h
¡
Bl
h (yl,y h) > 0
¢
; compare equations (4) and (10).
Therefore joint ownership is optimal if l is the key investor and l-ownership
is optimal if h is the key investor. Q.E.D.
Now ownership by the high-valuation agent is weakly dominated. Since
l is indispensable, h is unproductive on his own. Therefore h has the same
incentives under h-ownership and joint ownership while l has weakly better
incentives under joint ownership. Therefore the optimal ownership structure
is either joint ownership or l-ownership.
The beneﬁt of joint ownership is that l’s investment is higher while the
cost of joint ownership is that h’s investment is lower. The cost of joint
ownership is the higher, the higher are spillovers from h’s investment be-
cause spillovers motivate investment under l-ownership. When there are no
spillovers, there is no cost of joint ownership — only the beneﬁto fl’s higher
investment — and joint ownership is optimal.
Furthermore, if l is the key investor, joint ownership is optimal as l’s neg-
ative second term is then removed. Whereas when h has the most important
14investment, l-ownership is optimal because the only way to have a positive
second term for h is to allow for spillovers from his investment. This can be
accomplished by taking ownership away from him.
We have shown that the results depend importantly on whether the in-
dispensable government has high or low valuation for the public good. In
many developed countries the government can be assumed to have high val-
uation for the public good. Proposition 4 shows that the optimal ownership
structure resembles the private goods case of Hart and Moore (1990): the
key investor should be the owner and joint ownership is dominated.
In many developing countries it can be assumed that it is the pro-poor
NGO that has a high valuation for the public good. Our Proposition 5
shows that ownership by the high-valuation NGO is dominated when the
government is the only purchaser for the service. Despite its low valuation
for the public good, the government should always have an ownership stake.
Furthermore, joint ownership (which is dominated in a developed country
context) can emerge optimally.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we show that the optimal ownership of public good is not
solely driven by relative valuations. With public goods higher investment
improves everybody’s default payoﬀs and therefore the high-valuation agent’s
bargaining position is improved relative to the low-valuation agent. Allo-
cating ownership optimally is about maximizing this positive default payoﬀ
eﬀect for h and minimizing the negative eﬀect for l as identiﬁed by Besley
and Ghatak (2001). But it is the nature of human capital that determines
whether giving or removing ownership strengthens the eﬀect of investment
on default payoﬀs. Removing ownership from h allows for spillovers from
his investment and strengthens the positive investment eﬀect when l is indis-
pensable. While giving ownership to l minimizes his negative incentive eﬀect
when h is indispensable and there are spillovers from l’s investment.
Finally we relate our results to public-private partnerships where the
government as the only purchaser is indispensable. Our model abstracts
from the beneﬁts of bundling build and service provision usually emphasized
in the incomplete contracting literature on public-private partnerships (Hart
(2003), Bennett and Iossa (2006) and Martimort and Poyet (2008)). But
contrary to this literature we allow the providers to care about the project
15beneﬁts to the recipient — as is natural in a developing country context or
in "caring" sectors (Francois (2000) and Besley and Ghatak (2005)). Own-
ership by the supplier can be interpreted as PPP; private supplier owns the
project assets and contracts with the government to supply the public ser-
vice. Furthermore, joint ownership is a special type of PPP where both the
government and the supplier have veto power. Our results indicate that
the optimal governance structure for a developing country diﬀers from that
of a developed country. In a developed country where the government is
usually the high-valuation party PPP is optimal when the supplier is the
key investor. While in a developing country context PPP where the high-
valuation supplier is the sole owner is weakly dominated. However, it is
exactly in developing countries that the government is not necessarily the
only purchaser for e.g. health and primary education services. In such
cases ownership by the high-valuation NGO can be optimal as predicted by
Besley and Ghatak (2001). Furthermore, we have shown that a joint own-
ership type PPP is weakly dominated in a developed country but can arise
for a wide parameter range when a high-valuation NGO collaborates with an
indispensable government.
16A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.



















































i denotes i’s investment under j-ownership. Now if Bl
h (yl,y h) >
Bh
h (yl,y h) for given investments (11) does not hold for yl
h = yh
h. The left-hand-
side would be greater than the right-hand-side. Since the beneﬁt functions
are concave (and bij (yl,y h)=Bk
ij (yl,y h)=0by Assumption 2) equality
requires yl
h >y h
h. Conversely, if Bl
h (yl,y h) <B h
h (yl,y h) for given investments,
we have to have that yl
h <y h
h.


















































l (yl,y h) >B l
l (yl,y h) for given investments (12) does not hold for
yl
l = yh
l , now the right-hand-side would be greater than the left-hand-side.
Equality requires yl
l >y h
l . Conversely, if Bh
l (yl,y h) <B l




In sum, agent i has better incentives under l-ownership if and only if
Bi
i (yl,y h) <B
j
i (yl,y h) where i 6= j.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Suppose h is indispensable. Substituting Bl




































Since the second term in the left-hand-side is negative, it follows that yl
l >y h
l .
Then suppose l is indispensable. Substituting Bh








































In both cases when agent i is indispensable, agent j has best incentives
under l-ownership. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Suppose there is full spillover from h’s investment. Substituting Bl
h (yl,y h)=














































Since bh (yl,y h) ≥ Bh
h (yl,y h) we have yl
h >y h
h.
While when the full spillover from l’s investment (Bh
















































Since bl (yl,y h) ≥ Bl
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